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This Is Not Your Grandfather's Labor Union -
Or Is It?
Exercising Section 7 Rights in the Cyberspace Age
INTRODUCTION
There is a stretch of property along the banks of the
Monongahela River in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, that is home to
about a half dozen new buildings. Housed inside these gleaming
steel and glass structures are businesses working on the cutting
edge of the latest technology. A quarter-century ago, however - and
for the 141 years before that - this 48-acre tract comprised a
significant part of the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation's ("J &
L) Pittsburgh Works.1 Where once blast furnaces lit up the night
sky and red-hot ribbons of steel were rolled into the building
blocks of this nation, rollerbladers and joggers now wend their way
past the well-manicured campus of shiny buildings.
The rebirth of an urban brownfield is noteworthy enough, but the
site is particularly remarkable for the pages of American labor
history. For it was J & L that challenged the Wagner Act,2 the
foremost piece of federal labor legislation in the United States.
3
The heart of the Wagner Act4 ("Act"), and the epicenter of
controversy in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, is Section 7. This brief
provision, a scant forty words, granted workers the right to
organize themselves into unions of their own choice.5
1. John R. Lane, Introduction to MARK PERROTr, ELuzA REMEMBERING A PITTSBURGH STEEL
MiLL 13 (Howell Press 1989).
2. The suit culminated in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
While the steel maker's headquarters were located in Pittsburgh, the events giving rise to the
U.S. Supreme Court case took place at its sister plant, the Aliquippa Works, located 15 miles
northwest of Pittsburgh.
3. The Wagner Act, also known as the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
129-169 (1998) became effective in 1935. The Act is popularly known as the Wagner Act in
honor of its sponsor, U.S. Sen. Robert Wagner, a New York Republican. BENJAMIN TAYLOR &
FRED WITNEY, U.S. LABOR RELATIONS LAW 165 (1992). Significant amendments to the Act were
made in 1947 and 1959. The substance of those amendments is beyond the reach of this
Comment.
4. See ARcmBALD Cox ET AL, LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 77-78 (12th ed. 1996).
5. Prior to the 1947 amendments, Section 7 read as follows: "Employees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1998). The
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Steelworkers at J & L in the late 1930s - certainly emboldened
by the federal government's sweeping grant of protection over
unionization - engaged in this type of organizational activity. The
steel maker discharged them from their jobs as a consequence. 6
The United States Supreme Court decision righted this apparent
wrong by affirming not only the constitutional validity of the
Wagner Act, but also the decision of the newly-formed National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") which found that J & L
had violated the rights guaranteed the workers by the Act.
7
Nearly seven decades have gone by since the Jones & Laughlin
decision. The manufacturer's predecessor shuttered the Pittsburgh
Works in the mid-1980s, making the way for the Pittsburgh
Technology Center and its cluster of high-tech offices. Pittsburgh
and other so-called Rust Belt towns with traditionally high
concentrations of unionized workers have played witness to this
dramatic shift in the economic landscape.
The National Labor Relations Act nonetheless maintains its
vitality despite the decline in the industries that gave rise to the
Act's adoption. Where union organization drives once occurred
among uneducated men laboring in the soot and toil of factories
and mills, those efforts now take place in high-tech laboratories
staffed by men and women possessing advanced technical degrees.
However, as the clich6 goes, the more things change the more they
remain the same. Workers in high-tech industries face problems
familiar to their heavy industry counterparts of yesteryear, namely
how to bring the message of self-organization to their coworkers.
The beauty of the Act lies in its simple language and clear
purpose. Employees are given the statutory right to self-organize
and bargain collectively. The Board and the U.S. Supreme Court
have held that this right "necessarily encompass[es] the right to
effectively communicate with one another concerning
1947 amendments granted employees the right to refrain from engaging in such activities,
but only to the extent that they are not required as a condition of employment. Id.
6. See Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 28.
7. See id. at 34. The Court stated:
[The right of employees to organize] is a fundamental right. Employees have as clear a
right to organize and select their representatives for lawful purposes as the
respondent has to organize its business and select its own officers and agents.
Discrimination and coercion to prevent the free exercise of the right of employees to
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self-organization at the jobsite."8 This right continues to have
validity and purpose in the Internet Age despite the fact that the
Act was a product of an economic climate that has, in many
quarters, disappeared.
The latest proving ground for employee communication in the
work place is company-owned electronic mail ("e-mail") systems.9
The Board and the Court gave life to this statutory right through a
series of key decisions concerning employee communication at the
job site. As the characteristics of work and the work place changed
in ways never envisioned by the framers of the Act, the models by
which the Board and courts formulated the law on employee
communication arguably outgrew their Industrial heritage.
This is readily apparent from the agitation of practitioners and
commentators in the wake of a 1998 directive ° by the Board's
investigation branch. In the directive, the Board's General Counsel
("GC") applied traditional analytical models to contemporary
workplace phenomena. Specifically, the presence of electronic mail
("e-mail") in contemporary workplace settings has altered the way
employees communicate with one another.
The directive prompted a heated response from commentators
and practitioners operating from the management side of the labor
relations equation. This is not surprising. The casebooks are full of
employer resistance to situations related to employee
communication for the purpose of self-organization. Yet the Board
and the Court have managed through the years to harmonize
employees' statutory rights with employer property rights. This type
of careful balancing of important interests continues today with the
8. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 483, 491 (1978).
9. One source pegs employee usage of e-mail in the United States at 1 billion
messages per day. See Terrence Lewis, Monitoring Employee e-mail: Avoid Stalking and
Illegal Internet Conduct, PrrrsBURGH Bus. TIMES & J., May 19, 2000, at 40. Congress defined
e-mail in 1986. This definition shows its age, but nonetheless conveys in general terms how
e-mail operates. The definition is as follows:
[E-mail] is a form of communication by which private correspondence is transmitted
over public and private telephone lines. In its most common form, messages are typed
into a computer terminal, and then transmitted over telephone lines to a recipient
computer operated by an electronic mail company. If the intended addressee
subscribes to the service, the message is stored by the company's computer "mail
box" until the subscriber calls the company to retrieve its mail, which is then routed
over the telephone system to the recipient's computer .... Electronic mail systems
may be available for public use or may be proprietary, such as systems operated by
private companies for internal correspondence.
H.R. REP. No. 99-647, pt. 4, at 8 (1986).
10. Pratt & Whitney, NLRB Gen. Couns. Adv. Mem. Cases 12-CA-18446, 12-CA-18722,
12-CA-18745, 12-CA-18863 (Feb. 23, 1998). 1998 WL 1112978.
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advent of new technologies in the workplace.
Part I of this Comment explores the leading case law that laid
the groundwork for the Board and courts to analyze employee
communication issues. Part II discusses a recent line of Board
decisions and a trio of directives by the GC regarding e-mail
communication issues. Finally, in Part III, the GC's analysis will be
scrutinized to determine if its conclusions are valid.
I. TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION AND WORKPLACE
COMMUNICATION
A former chairman of the NLRB once observed that "[o]ne of the
major problems a union is confronted with in an organizational
campaign is how to communicate with employees it seeks to
organize."" The very proposition conjures up a ready-made conflict.
For on the one hand, an employer has a tremendous investment in
his plant and facilities and would prefer to oversee his property
interests without interference from parties who have not
contributed to the acquisition of such. On the other side of the
equation stand employees' rights under the shield of the Wagner
Act which guarantees workers the right to organize for the purpose
of collective bargaining. On this point, the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized that Section 7 organization rights are based on the
ability of employees to learn the advantages and disadvantages of
organization. 12 And, as a consequence, the High Court has long
recognized that Section 7 rights are fulfilled when employees have
the ability to effectively communicate with one another about
unionization at work.
3
Underpinning these lofty pronouncements is the Court's decision
in Republic Aviation v. NLRB 14 ("Republic Aviation"). In Republic
Aviation, the Court had the opportunity to resolve the conflict
between an employer's right to maintain discipline in the workplace
and the employees' rights protected under Section 7 of the Act.
As a consequence of its prominence in labor law,' 5 a brief
discourse on the facts of Republic Aviation will be instructive.
Republic Aviation manufactured planes for the military at a plant
11. WiLknm B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAw 64 (1993).
12. See Cent. Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 542-43 (1972).
13. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 491 (1978).
14. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
15. Republic Aviation has been cited in 1339 cases according to the Westlaw
databases. (visited Oct. 12, 2000) <http://web2.westlaw.com/keycite/
default.wl?cite=324 U%2ES%2E 793&newdoor=true&rs=LAWS2%2EO&vr=1 %2E0>.
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outside New York City during World War 11.16 Prior to any union
activity at its plant, the aviation manufacturer had adopted a rule
prohibiting solicitation of any kind.17 Nonetheless, union organizers
initiated a membership drive at the factory.'8 Despite the plant rule,
one worker, while on his lunch break, began passing out union
membership cards to his fellow workers.19 Plant management fired
the employee for violating the anti-solicitation rule.20 In another
instance, during the same organization campaign, three workers
were fired for wearing union buttons at work after repeated
management entreaties to remove the buttons.2' Company officials
said the buttons amounted to a tacit recognition of that particular
union when there was no such agreement. 22
The discharged employees sought relief with the filing of unfair
labor practice ("ULP") charges against the airplane maker.23 In
rendering its decision, the Board disagreed with the employer that
the wearing of union buttons was an implied recognition of a
particular union.24 The Board held that the manufacturer's no
solicitation rule violated Section 8(1)25 of the Act and the firings of
16. Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 794.
17. Id. The actual plant rule read, "Soliciting of any type cannot be permitted in the
factory or offices." Id. at 795.
18. Id. at 795
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 795.
22. Id.
23. Id. As stated previously, the heart of the Wagner Act is Section 7, which guarantees
employees the right to form or join unions. See supra note 5. "To make this right effective,
Congress outlawed employer practices that operated to deny workers the freedom to carry
out the collective bargaining function. In short, Congress ... was determined to prohibit any
interference with the exercise of this right." BENJAMIN TAYLOR & FRED WrrNEY, U.S. LABOR
RELATIONS LAw 176-77 (1992). The Act specified five employer practices that would tend to
interfere with employee exercise of Section 7 rights. It is an unfair labor practice for an
employer: (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights
to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. (2) To dominate or interfere with
the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other
support to it. (3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
(4) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges
or given testimony under the Act. (5) To refuse to bargain collectively with employee
representatives. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (1998).
24. See Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 795 (citing Republic Aviation, Inc., 51 N.LR.B.
1186, 1189 (1943)).
25. It is an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(1) for an employer "to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1998).
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the workers violated Section 8(3) of the Act.26 On appeal, the
Second Circuit affirmed the Board's decision; Republic Aviation's
petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was granted.
2 1
The Court's primary mission in Republic Aviation was to balance
the competing rights and interests of employers and employees. On
this note, the Court recognized that each of these competing
interests is valid:
Like so many others, these rights are not unlimited in the
sense that they can be exercised without regard to any duty
which the existence of rights in others may place upon
employer or employee. Opportunity to organize and proper
discipline are both essential elements in a balanced society.2 8
The Court prefaced its analysis in Republic Aviation by observing
that the Wagner Act's roomy language prohibits the imposition of a
strict set of remedies. 29 The Act, the Court went on to say, serves
as a statutory framework from within which the Board can
accomplish its primary goal, i.e., to allow employees to join unions
for their mutual aid and protection. 30  These are important
observations for the Court to make, because they reject the notion
that the Act requires a "one-size-fits-all" approach. Thus, the Court
embraced the concept that the Act demands a tailored,
fact-sensitive approach to cases arising under it.31 As will be
26. See Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 796. It is an unfair labor practice under Section
8(a)(3) for an employer to discriminate against an employee in regard to hire, discharge or
any other condition of employment to promote or discourage union membership. 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(3) (1998).
27. Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 796. The U.S. Supreme Court joined the Republic
Aviation case with a similar case emanating from the 5th Circuit, Le Tourneau Co. of
Georgia, 143 F2d 67 (5th Cir. 1944) The facts of Le Tourneau are worthy of a brief
explication. Two workers at the Georgia plant were fired after distributing union literature
on company-owned property while on their own time. See Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at
796-97. This was a violation of their employer's well-established and strictly enforced
anti-distribution policy. Id. The rule read, "In the future, no Merchants, Concern, Company or
Individual or Individuals will be permitted to distribute, post or otherwise circulate handbills
or posters, or any literature of any description on Company property without first securing
permission by the Personnel Department." Id. Le Tourneau promulgated the rule to curb
litter and theft from employee automobiles. Id. The Board said the employee discharges for
the union activity at Le Tourneau amounted to, as in Republic Aviation, violations of
sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). Id. (citing Le Tourneau, 54 N.L.R.B. 1253 (1943)). The Supreme
Court granted certiorari on account of the circuit split between the decisions in Le Tourneau
and Republic Aviation. See Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 797.
28. See Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 798.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. The Supreme Court enunciated a similar principle later when it stated "no such
Vol. 39:657
Section 7 Rights in the Cyberspace Age
evident later within this Comment, this is a crucial principle to
remember in the application of Republic Aviation to contemporary
questions concerning employee e-mail matters.
The Republic Aviation Court looked to several factors in
balancing the competing interests of employees and employers in
its resolution of the case: the rights guaranteed by Section 7, the
time and place of the employee activity, an employer's property
rights, and the employer's right to maintain discipline and order in
the workplace. The Court endorsed the Board's findings in both the
Republic Aviation and the Le Tourneau decisions. The Board had
held that the company rules against solicitation were adverse to the
employees' rights under the Wagner Act.82 In addition, in the
underlying Republic Aviation decision, the Board held that the
plant rules denied employees "their normal right to 'full freedom of
association' in the plant." The Board, and ultimately the Court,
concluded that employee time at the workplace is the "uniquely
appropriate" time and place for the exercise of Section 7 rightsY4
On the opposite side of the scale stands an employer's right to
control his workplace and derive the benefits of having employees
engaged in his operation. Here, the Court looked to the then-recent
Board decision, Peyton Packing Plant,35 for the now-famous
proposition: "Working time is for work."36 Employers are not barred
under the Wagner Act from creating and enforcing reasonable rules
for the purpose of controlling the discipline of the workforce while
on company time.3  The Court rejected Republic Aviation's
argument that the Act contravened an employer's property rights.
"It is not every interference with property rights that is within the
Fifth Amendment .... Inconvenience or even some dislocation of
property rights, may be necessary in order to safeguard the right to
collective bargaining."-s Consequently, that an employer owns the
property and can exercise the attending rights thereto is not
mechanical answers will avail for the solution of this non-mechanical, complex problem in
labor-management relations." NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958).
32. See Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 803.
33. Id. at 801 n.6.
34. Id. In a subsequent decision, the Board held that the work place is the one site
where workers convene daily and regularly, and, while at work, they share common
interests. As a consequence of this concentration of collective interest, the workplace is the
traditional place for worker discussion about union organization. See Gale Products, 142
N.L.R.B. 1246, 1249 (1963).
35. 49 N.LR.B. 828, 843 (1943).
36. See Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 803 n.10.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 802 n.8 (quoting Le Tourneau, 54 N.L.R.B. at 1260 (1944)).
2001 663
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dispositive of whether the employer can forbid the employees from
engaging in activity safeguarded by the Act.3 9 "Organization rights
are granted to workers by the same authority, the National
Government, that preserves the property rights. Accommodation
between the two must be obtained with as little destruction of one
as is consistent with the maintenance of the other."
40
Thus, to achieve the balance of Section 7 rights and an
employer's property rights, the Board and the courts have said that
employer rules banning union solicitation during working hours are
consistent with the balance between these competing interests.
However, such plant rules that prohibit employee solicitation on an
employee's own time, even on company property, tip that balance
away from the workers' statutory rights and, consequently, have
been struck down.41 Solicitation, "being oral in nature, impinges
upon the employer's interests only to the extent that it occurs on
working time."42 Thus, the Court's ultimate holding in Republic
Aviation and the lasting legacy of that decision is the presumption
adopted from the Board decision in Peyton Packing Company.4
Under this presumption, an employer can prohibit union
solicitation during work hours, and such a rule must be presumed
valid in the absence of evidence that it was adopted for
discriminatory purposes.44 Outside of working hours, such as lunch
time, rest periods or breaks, an employee can use his or her time
as he or she wishes, including engaging in Section 7-type activity
without employer interference.
45
The legacy of Republic Aviation, that an employer may
promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting employees from engaging
in solicitation during working hours, developed over the next
several years following Republic Aviation with relatively few
39. In a later landmark decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an employer's
property rights permit the exclusion of non-employee union organizers from company
premises. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105 (1956) (holding that an employer may
restrict non-employee access to his premises, but must yield in the situation when employees
would be beyond the reach of union organizers' reasonable efforts to communicate with
them); see also Lechmere v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (holding that non-employee union
organizers have the right of access to employer's premises only when the workers are so
inaccessible as to make ineffective organizers' reasonable efforts to reach them).
40. See Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112.
41. Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 802 n.8.
42. See Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 619 (1962).
43. See Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 804.
44. Id. at 803 n.10.
45. Id.
Vol. 39:657
Section 7 Rights in the Cyberspace Age
problems.46 Conversely, the law surrounding the distribution of
literature at the workplace did not have such a smooth progression.
Indeed, as the D.C. Circuit stated: "no-distribution rules have had a
checkered history."47 Ironically, the Board's decision in Le
Tourneau, which was consolidated into the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Republic Aviation, dealt squarely with the issue of
employees discharged for distributing literature in a plant parking
lot. There, the Board held that company rules centered on plant
orderliness and productivity have a particular force inside of the
building that does not carry out to areas beyond the production
area. 49 Just as the Board struck a balance between
employer-employee rights in Republic Aviation by distinguishing
activities that are impermissible on "working time" from those that
are allowed on "non-working time," the Board in Le Tourneau
struck a similar balance regarding the extent of permissible
distribution of literature on an employer's property.
One of the lasting standards emerging from Stoddard-Quirk is
the Board's distinction between solicitation and distribution. The
Board observed that solicitation and distribution are two distinct
forms of communication requiring differing forms of analysis in
reviewing plant rules concerning each.5° Solicitation is oral in
nature and intrudes on an employer's property interests when
workers engage in such activity while working; recall Peyton
Packing's "working time is for work."51 However, when viewed in
light of the statutory right to engage in such activity, employees'
rights would be completely meaningless if they could not exercise
such rights at the place most appropriate for this kind of activity.
Therefore, the Board, and later the Court, limited an employer's
property rights, but only to the extent that solicitation occurs on
non-working time.52
Distribution of literature, however, presented a problem entirely
46. See Stoddard-Quirk, 138 N.L.R.B. at 617.
47. See id. at 618 (citing United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 243 F.2d 593, 597 (D.C. Cir.
1957)).
48. See id. at 619. For the text of the plant rule at issue in Le Tourneau, see note 27,
supra.
49. See Le Tourneau, 54 N.LR.B. at 1261.
50. See Stoddard-Quirk, 138 N.L.R.B. at 619. Unlike the dissent, the majority in
Stoddard-Quirk refused to view regulations concerning solicitation in pari materia with
those concerning distribution, noting that in no prior case before the Board or the courts
was the issue of the distinction between the two dispositive to the resolution of the case. Id.
at 619 n.5.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 620.
2001 665
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distinct from that of oral solicitation. Handbills and the like are
dissimilar from speech, as they are tangible and are of a permanent
nature. The Board held that, as a method of disseminating
information, distribution succeeds so long as an employee receives
the handbill or leaflet.53 The attending problem with handbill
distribution on company property is litter and the potential for
production hazards resulting therefrom.54 Litter in the workplace is
a problem regardless of when employees receive handbills.5 It
followed that because an employer's interest in his shop is at its
greatest in the production areas, the distribution of union literature
might be prohibited in so-called working areas.5 Outside of
working areas, but still on employer premises, literature may be
distributed to employees without employer interference. By setting
such limitations on each party's rights, the substance of their
respective interests is afforded appropriate weight. 57
The rule emerging from Stoddard-Quirk clarifies the parameters
established earlier in Republic Aviation. Anti-solicitation rules are
presumptively invalid if they apply to activity conducted during
non-working time. Likewise, anti-distribution rules are
presumptively invalid if they apply to distribution taking place in
non-work areas of the plant.58 The balance struck was in accord
with the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Babcock & Wilcox that a
"limitation on the employer's property right in each situation is
imposed only to the extent that it is necessary for the maintenance
of the employees' organizational right."59
Again, as was the case in Republic Aviation, the Board and the
Court recognized a fundamental mandate in solicitation/distribution
cases. That is, the decisions of Republic Aviation, Le Tourneau,
and Stoddard-Quirk establish an analytical framework for tailoring
decisions based on particular facts within the solicitation/
53. See id. Distribution of union signature cards, however, is viewed as solicitation. See
id. at 620 n.6.
54. See Stoddard-Quirk, 138 N.LR.B. at 619.
55. Id.
56. Work areas are those where employees are engaged in productive activity. Id. See,
e.g., United Parcel Serv., 327 N.LR.B. 65 (1998) (noting a number of Board decisions holding
that a working area is where employees do the tasks assigned to them as part of their
employment).
57. Stoddard-Quirk, 138 N.LR.B. at 620-21.
58. Id. at 621.
59. See id. The presumption of invalidity of each of the anti-solicitation/distribution
rules is overcome only with a showing that special circumstances require the rule in order to
maintain production or discipline. Id. at 621-22. Moreover, the Board said that such a
showing by an employer must not amount to mere assertions of such necessity. Id. at 622.
666 Vol. 39:657
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distribution arena.
The crucial considerations the Board and courts must pay heed
to in striking the balance between an employer's property interests
and employees' statutory rights are clear. First, an employee's time,
even while on company premises, is his or her own, and he or she
may engage in Section 7 activity during this time. Second, the
employer's property interest in his or her plant is not entirely
dispositive of the lawfulness of a given plant rule. Nonetheless, the
employer's interests are at their greatest in the working areas of
the plant; those rules prohibiting distribution in non-working areas
are presumed invalid. But, an employer's concern for litter in the
workplace is a legitimate one.60 Third, a policy of accommodation
of competing interests must prevail in Board decisions with regard
to anti-solicitation/distribution rules.61 This last point is crucial to
the analysis of e-mail communications in the workplace. As will be
seen in the subsequent discussion of the Board's analysis of
solicitation/distribution rules with regard to e-mail, no hard rules
govern all situations.
II. E-MAIL IN THE WORKPLACE - RECENT BOARD PRONOUNCEMENTS
The Board has yet to address directly the issue of whether
employee use of an employer's e-mail system comprises solicitation
or distribution. In a recent decision the Board adopted an analogy
which likened employer-owned e-mail systems to company phones
or bulletin boards.62  In the underlying proceeding, the
Administrative Law Judge ("AL) made this finding in dicta and,
thus, the AL's characterization is of questionable precedential
60. See United Parcel Serv., 327 N.L.R.B. at 2 (an "employer has a legitimate interest in
keeping [work areas] free from litter."). Mere assertion of this as a means to defeat
distribution campaigns, however, will not validate the rule. See Stoddard-Quirk, 138 N.LR.B.
at 621-22.
61. As the U.S. Supreme Court later stated: "[T]he locus of the accommodation
between the legitimate interests of both may fall at differing points along the spectrum
depending on the nature and strength of the respective § 7 rights and private property rights
asserted in any given context." Beth Israel Hosp., 437 U.S. at 504 (1978) (quoting Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522 (1976)).
62. See Adtranz, ABB Daimler-Benz Transp., N.A., Inc., 2000 WL 79735, at *6 (May 31,
2000). The analogy actually was the finding of the administrative law judge in this particular
case. Under this scheme, an employee or union has no right to use an employer's phone or
bulletin board. Id. (citing Honeywell, 262 N.LR.B. 1402 (1982) (dealing with company
bulletin boards) and Union Carbide Corp., 259 N.LR.B. 974 (1981) (no right to use employer
telephone)). But once an employer allows employees to use these means of communication,
it cannot restrict such usage in a discriminatory manner to prevent union access. Id.
2001
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value for future Board decisions. 3 Moreover, the ALl's holding
presents a shortsighted, but not uncommon, view& of e-mail as a
form of communication. As will be discussed below, e-mail can be
the most appropriate form of employee communication in certain
situations. Therefore, it cannot be gainsaid that to eliminate this
means of workplace communication would amount to a complete
undoing of the tenets of Republic Aviation and its progeny.
The only other Board statement regarding company e-mail
systems and union activity came in E.I. DuPont Nemours & Co
("DuPont). 65 In this case, the Board found that the chemical
manufacturer had promulgated a rule explicitly prohibiting the use
of its e-mail system for the dissemination of any union notices or
literature.6 The company maintained this rule despite the fact that
it tolerated employees' use of its e-mail system to transmit sundry
non-business items.67 The Board agreed with the ALT's underlying
decision in DuPont, that the rule discriminated against unions, and,
therefore, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.68 This case is
unhelpful, however, in resolving the issue of whether e-mail
63. Adtranz involved a disputed representation election. Although the employer had a
rule that employees could not use company computers for personal reasons, there was no
evidence to suggest that the company e-mail system was used for union discussions. See
Adtranz, 2000 WL 79735, at *6.
64. The bulletin board analogy garners much support in management quarters. See
Daniel J. Roy, Organizing: Legality of Employees' Use of E-mail for Union Organizing
Debated at Forum, 113 DAILY LAB. REP., June 12, 2000, at C-I.
65. 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993). The Board first discussed e-mail and Section 7 rights,
albeit in a non-union context, in Timekeeper Systems, Inc., 323 N.LR.B. 244 (1997). In
Timekeeper Systems, a computer programmer distributed a caustic critique of a management
decision via e-mail to all company employees. After a series of negotiations between the
disgruntled employee and his perturbed boss, the employee was fired for failing to give a
written explanation of his acts. The employee brought an unfair labor practice charge against
his former employer and prevailed. The Board found the employee's initial e-mail to be
"concerted activity" that was within the protection of the Act. For a discussion of the Act's
application to non-unionized white-collar workers and the Timekeeping Systems decision,
see Deborah SK. Jagoda and Jennifer M. Chow, Nonunion Employees Have Traditional
Labor Law Rights, 5 EMp. L STRATEGIST 1 (1997).
66. See E.I. DuPont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 919. Several employees involved in an
organizational campaign at the chemical company were disciplined for transmitting
union-related notices over the company's e-mail system. NLRB Acting General Counsel Fred
Feinstein's Report on Cases Decided from March 31, 1996 to June 30, 1998 (Full Text of
Report), 172 DAILY LAB. REP., Sept. 4, 1998, at E-4.
67. See E.L DuPont, 311 N.LR.B. at 919.
68. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - (1) to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1) (1998). The Board ordered the company to cease and desist from discriminatorily
prohibiting employees from using the electronic mail system for distributing union literature
or notices. See E.L DuPont, 311 N.LR.B. at 897-98.
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constitutes solicitation or distribution, as the Board did not engage
in this type of analysis in DuPont. What remains instructive on this
issue, however, are a series of Advice Memoranda issued by the
Advice Division of the NLRB's GC's office.69 These directives,
comprising the NLRB's first analytical sortie into e-mail as
solicitation/distribution debate, are what practitioners are
compelled to utilize as guidance in the absence of a plain statement
by the Board.
A. A Trio of Advice Memoranda
Foremost among this series of advice memoranda is the Pratt &
Whitney case.7 0 Reflective of the type of tailored analysis required
for solicitation/distribution cases, Pratt & Whitney is the standard
for subsequent memoranda with regard to e-mail communication
issues. Moreover, it represented a bold opportunity for the Board
to construe the Act's protections by establishing a nexus between
the Act's industrial heritage and today's high-tech workplace. The
Pratt & Whitney directive illustrates the type of fact-sensitive
inquiry required from reviewing bodies in analyzing employee
workplace communication issues. Moreover, the directive assumes
a prominent role in the analysis of subsequent advice memoranda.
Therefore, it is not only useful but necessary to detail the facts of
the Pratt & Whitney case. As a consequence of its influence, Pratt
& Whitney ultimately provides guidance for labor organizers,
employers, attorneys and the bench.
The nearly 2500 Pratt & Whitney employees, mostly aerospace
engineers and their technical staff, design rocket engines at the
firm's West Palm Beach, Florida, facility.7' The work of the
engineers is very complex and requires extensive computer use.
The importance of computers to Pratt & Whitney's operations
cannot be overstated as the employer both allowed employees to
connect their home computers to the company's network and, in
69. The NLRB instructed its field offices in early 2000 to forward all cases involving
e-mail to the General Counsel's office. See Michael J. McCarthy, Sympathetic Ear: Your
Manager's Policy on Employee's E-mail May Have a Weak Spot, WALL ST. J., April 25, 2000,
at Al.
70. Pratt & Whitney, NLRB Gen. Couns. Adv. Mem. Cases 12-CA-18446, 12-CA-18722,
12-CA-18745, 12-CS-18863 (Feb. 23, 1998). 1998 WL 1112978. "[T]he General Counsel's view
[in advice memoranda] does not have the force of law unless it is adopted by the Board."
See Keith J. Rosenblatt, Can Employers Prohibit Non-Business E-Mail?, 8 METROPOLrrAN
CORP. CouNs., May 200, 18 (col. 1). Advice memoranda of the General Counsel are discussed
in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
71. See Pratt & Whitney at *1.
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some instances, issued laptop computers to staff to allow them to
remotely access its network.72 In 1995, several employees began a
union organization drive at the rocket lab. Transmitting their
organizational, message by traditional methods of face-to-face
communication or hand billing proved unfeasible, so the employee
organizers resorted to the company's e-mail system.73 This was a
logical decision. After all, as testimony revealed, most or all of the
employees used the company computers so extensively that e-mail
was the primary means of communication between them. 74
Pratt & Whitney had enacted a policy prohibiting personal use of
its computer systems, but the policy was not enforced strictly.
75
Pratt & Whitney management nonetheless imposed disciplinary
measures on several employees for using company computers to
propagate union-related e-mail messages and to download union
material from the Internet.76 The GC's analysis of the situation
created by these facts was premised upon precedents governing
traditional employee work place communication. Namely, the GC
focused on the factors set forth in the line of decisions beginning
with Republic Aviation and culminating in Stoddard-Quirk.7  The
succeeding sections of this Comment detail the application of those
factors by the GC in Pratt & Whitney.
B. E-mail: Solicitation or Distribution?
Following Stoddard-Quirk, the distinction between solicitation
and distribution must be made in light of the employee's statutory
72. Id. Approximately 1096 of these employees were issued laptops. Id.
73. The organizers claimed to have sent about 10 mass e-mailings to the Pratt &
Whitney engineers before management raised a flag with regard to such use of its e-mail
system. See Noam S. Cohen, Corporations Battling to Bar Use of E-mail for Unions, N.Y.
TIMEs, August 23, 1999, at C1.
74. Pratt & Whitney at *1. One employee testified that he spent up to 8096 of his work
time on the computer. Id.
75. Id. For example, the company tolerated use of the e-mail system for the
transmission of jokes, stories and other non-company related announcements.
76. One employee, an aerospace engineer, was suspended from his job for a month.
See McCarthy, supra note 69. The disciplinary measures formed the basis of an unfair labor
practice charge filed against the company.
77. Stoddard-Quirk serves well as a general guideline for these factors. Even though
they are stated elsewhere in this Comment, I am providing them here as a reminder.
Employer rules prohibiting solicitation during non-work time are presumed invalid in the
absence of special circumstances; employer rules prohibiting distribution in non-work areas
likewise are presumed invalid; property rights of an employer are not entirely dispositive of
a rule's validity; moreover, in the arena of anti-solicitation/distribution rules, the Board and
courts are compelled to strike a balance between employer property rights and the statutory
right of employees to participate in union activity without employer interference.
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rights to organize and the countervailing interest of an employer's
property rights.78  Recalling that the validity of employer
anti-solicitation/distribution rules is measured in terms of their
application to physical spaces on the employer's property, 9 the GC
concluded in Pratt & Whitney that the computer terminals and
company network comprised employees' "work area."80 It could not
have been otherwise as the employees demonstrably utilized
computers to such an extent that the traditional conceptions of
work areas, like the shop floor, are not applicable. In the "virtual
office," there are no production lines with workers standing
shoulder-to-shoulder, as computers and modem lines now form the
connections between workers engaged in similar tasks often from
different locations.
Notwithstanding the incompatibility of traditional notions of
"work areas" with the facts at play in Pratt & Whitney, the GC
concluded that the Republic Aviation and Stoddard-Quirk
decisions maintain their validity in evaluating these issues. Thus,
broad employer rules prohibiting solicitation activity during
non-working times are presumptively invalid in the absence of
special circumstances.
8'
The GC's determination that, in some instances, e-mail
communication amounts to solicitation relied on a four-pronged
base of support. First, the GC - in accord with Stoddard-Quirk -
determined that if a particular communication may be reasonably
expected to draw a spontaneous response or to start a
conversation with the recipient, the communication is solicitation.82
Second, the GC embraced Congress' view that e-mail is "interactive
in nature and can involve virtually instantaneous 'conversation.' "83
Third, the GC cited a Florida appellate court decision supporting
the proposition that e-mail is closely associated with solicitation.8 4
78. Stoddard-Quirk, 615 N.LR.B. at 617.
79. For example, anti-solicitation rules are presumptively invalid if they prevent
workers from engaging in oral discussion about union matters on company premises during
non-working time. Likewise, anti-distribution rules are presumptively invalid if they extend to
non-work areas of the plant. See note 77, supra.
80. See Pratt & Whitney, 1998 WL 1112978, at *4.
81. See id. at *5. Special circumstances, taking the lead from Republic Aviation,
remain an employer's concern for efficient production and/or plant discipline. Id.
82. See id.
83. Id. at *5 n.26, (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-647, pt. 5, at 22 (1986)). This House Report
concerned the Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1998).
84. Id. at *5 n.25 (citing In re Amendments to Rule of Judicial Administration 2.051,
651 So.2d 1185 (Fla 1995)). The Florida High Court, in discussing public access to court
records, stated that e-mail is more akin to spoken communications than telephone
2001
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Finally, the GC asserted that e-mail is often personal and
individually targeted and, thus, is akin to individualized speech.85
Even where e-mail is not focused on a particular person, the GC
reasoned that, because e-mail affords the recipient the opportunity
for spontaneous response, it is still more like oral communication
than handbill distribution. 86 However, if the communication does
not lend itself to such an exchange and its purpose is served
simply upon receipt by the target, it is no different from a leaflet
and, thus, amounts to distribution. The GC's contention is
controversial, as it is premised on the characterization of "some"
e-mail messages as solicitation.87 The GC's distinction treads a fine
line and leaves no clear-cut rule as to what e-mail amounts to
solicitation and what e-mail is better characterized as distribution.
The validity of the GC's decision in Pratt &Whitney will be
discussed below.
C. Valid Concern over Litter
Recognizing that litter is a legitimate problem associated with the
distribution of handbills and other printed materials, the Board in
Stoddard-Quirk permitted employers to enforce plant rules
prohibiting such distribution in work areas. 88 In the context of
e-mail communication, the GC acknowledged that electronic
communications pose similar problems with regard to company
computer networks. Much as discarded handbills clutter an area
and carry the potential of impeding workplace efficiency, "cyber
litter" in the form of mass e-mail to large numbers of company
employees likewise clutters and potentially hampers computer
network efficiency. Because e-mail files occupy computer storage
conversations or printed media. See In re Amendments, 651 So.2d at 1186.
85. See Pratt & Whitney, 1998 WL 1112978, at *5.
86. Id.
87. Practitioners and commentators espousing a pro-management view of this issue
have been critical of this aspect of the General Counsel's memorandum. See Allegra K.
Williams, Business-Only E-mail Policies in the Labor Organizing Context: It Is Time to
Recognize Employee and Employer Rights, 52 FED. COMM. LJ. 777, 785 (2000) (arguing that
such a rule creates problems with respect to monitoring and, by extension, employee
surveillance, a prohibited activity under the Act); Maureen W. Young, Can Employers Limit
Employee Use of Company E-mail Systems for Union Purposes?, 72 N.Y. ST. B.J. 30, 34-35
(2000) (questioning General Counsel's analogy arguing that e-mail as solicitation imposes too
great a burden on employer property interests); NLRB Capable of Deciding Arising Issues,
Panel Says, 163 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 33 (Jan. 17, 2000), at D-19 (characterizing e-mail as
distribution and raising surveillance issue).
88. See Pratt & Whitney, 1998 WL 1112978, at *6 (citing Stoddard-Quirk, 138 N.L.R.B.
at 621).
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space and thereby decrease network efficiency, a burdened
computer network impedes the productivity of employees working
on that network.8 9 Furthermore, a wired employee may not
necessarily wait until non-working time to read an e-mail
message °
The GC was able to see past these matters in Pratt & Whitney,
repeating the conclusion that, at least in some instances, e-mail is
more akin to solicitation.91 The GC was cognizant of the fact that
the incursion on an employer's property rights depends on the
facts.92 Ultimately, the GC concluded that Pratt & Whitney's
across-the-board ban on employee use of its e-mail system for
non-business purposes was overly broad and, therefore, invalid.9 3
The Pratt & Whitney directive became a lightning rod for
criticism from practitioners and commentators in the absence of a
Board ruling on this issue. And, in light of this deficiency, Pratt &
Whitney also became the measuring stick for a pair of subsequent
GC memoranda. These subsequent directives likewise examined
company policies concerning employee use of company e-mail
systems.94 The rationale for the GC's decisions in each of these
subsequent cases follows that set forth in the Pratt & Whitney
memorandum. However, these two cases are distinguishable to the
extent that, only in TU Electric, was an employee disciplined for
using company e-mail for union-related messages.95 The GCQ after
89. See Williams, supra note 87, at 790-91.
90. See Pratt & Whitney, 1998 WL 1112978, at *6.
91. Id. The General Counsel rejected the contention that alternative means of
communication were available to Pratt & Whitney employees, relying on the statement in
Republic Aviation to the effect that such considerations are immaterial in the face of an
overbroad ban on solicitation - like the one in effect at Pratt & Whitney.
92. A subsequent unionization vote failed at Pratt & Whitney. Following the issuance of
the Advice Memoranda, Pratt & Whitney officials retooled their company's e-mail policy.
Mirroring language contained within the Act, Pratt & Whitney now permits employees to use
its e-mail system for discussing the "terms and conditions of employment and the employee's
interest in self-organization." See McCarthy, supra note 59.
93. See Pratt & Whitney, 1998 WL 1112978, at *6.
94. See TU Electric, Gen. Couns. Adv. Mem. Case No. 16-CA-19810 (October 18, 1999)
1999 NLRB GCM LEXIS 19 (finding the company's no solicitation/distribution policy facially
overbroad and, thus, violative of the Act) and IRIS-USA, Gen. Comm. Adv. Mem. Case
32-CA-17763 (February 2, 2000) 2000 WL 257107 (finding a company's policy not overbroad
on its face).
95. See TU Electric, 1999 NLRB GCM LEXIS 19, at *4. The Company promulgated a
rule in its employee handbook under the title "Company Assets." The plant rule restricted
employee use of company equipment "for only legitimate business reasons on behalf of the
Company." See id. at *2. Furthermore, under its "Computers and Software" policy, employee
use of TU Electric's computer equipment was limited to business purposes only. See id. The
Company's "No Solicitation/No Distribution" policy permitted employees to seek charitable
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reviewing the TU Electric case, instructed the Regional Director to
issue an 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) complaint against the employer.96 The
fact that the GC directed disciplinary measures against TU Electric
makes it, like Pratt & Whitney, worthy of an explanation of its
facts.
TU Electric is an electric utility located in Texas.97 The TU
Electric chemical engineers testified that, although daily e-mail use
was limited to about an hour a day, computers played a prominent
role in employee relations.98 Despite the company rule on computer
use, TU Electric apparently had tolerated e-mail use for reasons
that both comported with and diverged from its no solicitation/
distribution rule.99 However, when an employee disseminated e-mail
about an upcoming union election, management officials
reproached him for violating the company's policies and ordered
him to refrain from such activity. 1°°
The GC's Advice Division, upon receipt of the ULP charge against
TU Electric, concluded that the company's anti-solicitation/
distribution policy was both overly restrictive and only selectively
enforced. 1 1 As a matter of course, the GC reiterated the Republic
Aviation and Stoddard-Quirk principles in assessing the validity of
the utility's anti-solicitation/distribution policies. This type of
analysis is routine, time-tested and beyond reproach. Broad
strictures against employee communication and disparate
enforcement have been routine subjects of Board decisions with
results adhering to the principles announced in Republic Aviation
and Stoddard-Quirk. Of particular note in TU Electric, however, is
the GC's reliance on Pratt & Whitney for the proposition that a
company's computer network may constitute the employees' "work
donations, to hand out literature related to such organizations with the permission of
management and to use company bulletin boards to post certain items so long as these
postings were not routine or for commercial purposes. Id. at *1.
96. See id. at *14-15. See also notes 25-26, supra, for an explanation of 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3) violations.
97. See id. at *1.
98. See id. at *2-3. The employee subjected to discipline testified that employees used
the computers and e-mail to communicate with one another and management daily; that
company policy was transmitted via its computers; and that management routinely forwarded
required reading to its employees via its e-mail system. Id at *3.
99. TU Electric, 1999 NLRB GCM LEXIS 19, at *4. Testimony revealed that company
e-mail was used for soliciting employees for charitable organizations, "limited"
communication with spouses outside of work, and distribution of various personal
announcements. Id.
100. See id. at *34.
101. See id. at *12-13.
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area" for the purposes of a Republic Aviation/Stoddard-Quirk
analysis.10 2 The GC concluded that, although the TU Electric
employees did less work on their computers than the Pratt &
Whitney engineers, the TU Electric network amounted to their
"work area."103
The TU Electric "work area" finding was the basis for the GC's
decision to uphold the validity of an employer's e-mail policy in the
more recent IRIS-USA advice directive. °4 In IRIS-USA, the
employer's policy limited employee use of its system to
company-only purposes. 10 5 The GC declined to make a decision on
the validity of the rule based on the absence of facts indicating that
IRIS-USA's computers qualified as the "work area" of its
employees. 0 6  "In sharp contrast" to TU Electric, IRIS-USA
employees had very limited access to company-owned computers
as they were engaged in manufacturing and distribution activities.107
The absence of this predicate finding thus precluded the GC froh
engaging in further analysis under the rules of Republic Aviation.
and Stoddard-Quirk.
III. ASSESSING THE GC's ANALYSIS IN THE MEMORANDA
In the wake of the trio of advice memoranda, it becomes readily
apparent that technology could force a shift in thinking for the
Board in the analysis of solicitation/distribution issues. This is
already apparent in the re-definition of work area. This evolution
will continue to manifest itself in other aspects of labor law as
well. Prior to the emergence of e-mail as a means for employees to
communicate at the workplace, Republic Aviation, Stoddard-Quirk
and their progeny supplied the necessary rationale to resolve such
cases. However, the ubiquity of computers in the workplace and
102. Id. at *10-11.
103. See id. at *11. "Although chemistry technicians use other computer systems for
their substantive scientific duties, it is clear that the e-mail system comprises a significant
aspect of their productive work life, and thus constitutes a 'work area' under Republic
Aviation, if not the employees' sole work area." Id.
104. See IRIS-USA, 2000 WL 257107, at *3.
105. See id. at *3. The policy stated: "Employees are expected to use the voicemail,
electronic mail and computer systems for company business only and not for personal
purposes. Personal purposes include, but are not limited to, soliciting or proselytizing for
commercial ventures, religious or political causes, outside organizations or other
non-job-related solicitations." Id. The General Counsel reiterated the Pratt & Whitney rule
that broad bans against all non-business use of e-mail, including messages within the ambit





the resulting development of employee e-mail communication
demand a re-evaluation of the rules by which solicitation/
distribution cases are resolved. The GC's position on this point in
Pratt & Whitney is largely unassailable because it follows the
mandates of Republic Aviation and Stoddard-Quirk.08 However,
the GC's analysis has been subject to criticism on at least four
fronts. Those criticisms are described and addressed forthwith.
Particularly frequent reproach has been leveled at the GC's
'characterization of e-mail as solicitation. 109 This criticism falls short
in several regards. First, following the rationale of Stoddard-Quirk,
solicitation is communication that may prompt a response. To
baldly assert that an e-mail message concerning such things as
one's working conditions or wages would not engender a response
from the recipient ignores the realities of technology. Electronic
mail functions in a way that permits users to instantaneously send
and respond to messages. Thus, a conservative approach to this
,fact alone brings e-mail within the solicitation framework of
Stoddard-Quirk.
Moreover, this type of criticism fails to afford the Board its place
in the oversight of labor relations. The U.S. Supreme Court has
expressed the view that the Board has the responsibility of
"applying the Act's general prohibitory language in the light of the
infinite combination of events that might be charged as violative of
its terms." 10 Therefore, unthinking assertions of what is, and what
is not, solicitation contravenes the policy and purpose of the Act.
In Pratt & Whitney and in other instances, the GC has specifically
qualified the characterization of e-mail as solicitation. So far, this
characterization has been dispositive in only two instances, in Pratt
& Whitney and in TU Electric. In each of these instances, the GC
has engaged in the type of balancing that precedent in this area
demands. Therefore, the e-mail as solicitation determination by the
GC was not without support and, thus, is worthy of serious
consideration by the Board in future decisions.
The criticism that e-mail may be tailored to engender a response,
thus likening it to oral solicitation, has merit, although it is
somewhat dubious. Under this type of thinking, an employee union
108. But see Cohen, supra note 73 (objecting to the GC's use of industrial age
precedent to resolve disputes centered in new technologies).
109. See Rosenblatt, supra note 70 (asserting that any e-mail can be tailored to prompt
a response from its recipient). See also Young, supra note .87, at 35 (asserting that the GC's
determination minimizes displacement of employer property interests).
110. NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226, 231 (1948).
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advocate may send an e-mail notice to other employees with the
requirement that the recipient return it to the sender to show
receipt of the message. Thus, the bilateral exchange envisioned
under the Stoddard-Quirk analysis is accomplished. The criticism
of this "false response" only goes so far, however, when one
considers that traditional non-wired notions of permissible
employee exchange include situations where a union organizer tells
his coworker of a union event during their break time, and the
recipient coworker simply nods his head in acknowledgment of this
communication. To suggest that mere acknowledgment of receipt of
e-mail would be enough to preclude certain e-mail from
consideration as solicitation is to engage in sophistry.
A more genuine issue raised by the characterization of e-mail as
solicitation is that such activity may not occur exclusively during
non-work time. There is no guarantee, in the absence of employer
surveillance, that a message sent by employees during non-working
hours will be read during non-working time. Currently, federal law
prohibits the interception of electronic mail, but some exceptions
permit employers to engage in such surveillance to monitor
employee e-mail.' A consideration to be mindful of as well, and
one beyond the scope of this Comment, is the illegality of employer
surveillance of employee union organization activity."2 But it
appears that in the workplace context, employees have no privacy
rights when it comes to their e-mail sent on company systems." 3
The so-called "cyber litter" argument presents yet another area
ripe for criticizing the GC's rationale in Pratt & Whitney. Because
e-mail received on an employer's system consumes computer
storage space, it has the potential to impede the efficiency of
company computer systems." 4 The cyber clutter determination was
111. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1998).
112. The Board prohibits an employer from even giving the impression of surveillance
under § 8(a)(1). "Employees should be free to participate in union organizing campaigns
without the fear that members of management are peering over their shoulders, taking note
of who is involved in union activities, and in what particular ways." Flexsteel Indus., 311
N.L.R.B. 257 (1993).
113. Debate Over Employer E-mail Policies Is Complicated by NLRB Decision That
Messages Were Protected by LMRA, 155 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 257, June 30, 1997, at D19. See
also Smyth v. Pillsbury, 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (upholding dismissal of at-will
employee who transmitted "unprofessional comments" via company e-mail system).
114. Frank C. Morris, Jr., Issues from the Electronic Workplace. E-mail
Communications: The Developing Employment Law Nightmare, ALI-ABA 344 (July 25,
1996) (stating that e-mail impinges on an employer's property interest to the extent that it
deprives the employer of an employee's work time when messages are read, and it drains
employer resources by creating a computer system that handles a large influx of e-mail
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addressed in Pratt & Whitney, but it was not dispositive to the
resolution of the case. The cyber clutter issue is closely related to
the most glaring oversight in the GC's directive in Pratt & Whitney.
That is, the GC failed to address in Pratt & Whitney whether there
was an e-mail equivalent of distribution."5 This is a significant
mistake. The Board in Stoddard-Quirk said that employee
communications of a lasting, more permanent quality qualified as
distribution."16 Thus, employers can ban the dissemination of such
items in the work area. Certainly, e-mail falls into this category, as
the recipient can read and re-read an e-mail after its initial receipt.
Moreover, like handbills, e-mail can litter the computerized "work
place" and impede network efficiency. The cyber clutter issue is a
valid criticism but, like the other criticisms discussed herein, it has
its shortcomings.
It cannot be gainsaid that an employer's property interest in his
facilities is at its greatest in the production areas. Sources of
interference with that interest may be prohibited to preserve and
protect the employer's interest. It is clear under traditional modes
of analysis that if so-called cyber clutter - in the form of a deluge
of union-related e-mail messages - impedes worker efficiency,
precedent establishes an employer's right to prohibit this type of
activity in the work area.
Perfunctory analysis of these issues disregards the importance of
the balancing process the Board and courts must engage in to
resolve employee workplace communication issues. Precedent in
this area, time and time again, demonstrates the necessity of
engaging in a balancing of competing interests to resolve these
types of matters. Moreover, mechanical rules will not suffice, and,
thus, each situation must be addressed on its own particular
circumstances. There is no apparent reason to divert from this
course of action in the face of technology's advance into the
workplace.
CONCLUSION
In both Pratt & Whitney and TU Electric, the GC determined
that the employees performed a sufficient amount of their work on
messages).
115. Pratt & Whitney, 1998 WL 1112978, at *6. The employer's broad ban on employee
use of its e-mail system for non-business purposes precluded the General Counsel from this
analysis. Id.
116. See Stoddard-Quirk, 138 N.LR.B. at 621-22 (1962).
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computers such that the computer networks "in a very real sense"
constituted those employees' work area. Assuming arguendo that
the facts of a given case necessitate a finding that a computer
network "in a very real sense" makes up the employees' work area,
the employer could prevail through a showing that the union e-mail
entering the work area has wrought a particular hazard to
employee efficiency. However, this showing must be made through
a particularized demonstration of the facts. This could include, but
is not limited to, a showing of the company's overall computer
storage space, the amount of such space dedicated to e-mail
storage, the effect of employee e-mail use on overall productivity,
and the effect on network efficiency from union-related e-mail
traffic. Broad assertions of the need to control litter, in the absence
of objective proof, will not justify a limitation on employees'
distribution rights.1 '7 This is consistent with the Board's
long-standing policy favoring flexible decision-making.
An employer's property interest may have to yield in some
instances but only to the extent that is necessary to preserve
employees' Section 7 rights. Flexibility is necessary in the equation
because standards that apply to the largest of corporations
operating in one sector of the economy should not apply to the
smallest, operating in a totally different sector."8 Rigidity simply
contradicts the purpose and policy of the Act.
One question, however, remains: should an employer be able to
prohibit use of its e-mail system as a consequence of the
distribution-like qualities of e-mail? The facile answer, of course, is
yes. At least one commentator has argued that Stoddard-Quirk
demands such a conclusion."9 However, e-mail clearly bears the
indicia of solicitation as well. A conundrum, therefore, exists
because e-mail occupies both sides of the solicitation/distribution
divide. The resolution of disputes arising from the two-faced nature
of e-mail will require some not so new thinking by the Board. Like
so many decisions by the Board and courts in the past on this
issue, the answer to the problem lies in striking an appropriate
balance between the competing interests at stake. The Board and
courts must refrain from the mechanical application of Republic
Aviation and Stoddard-Quirk by merely using those decisions as
117. Id.
118. Frank C. Morris, Jr., points to Kodak, where employees post more than 2 million
e-mail messages a day via its e-mail system, as support for a tightening of restrictions on
union access to company e-mail systems. Morris, supra note 11,4.
119. Id.
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guidelines. In addition, the Board must stay faithful to the
proposition that property rights of employers may have to yield to
effectuate employees' Section 7 rights.
Frederick D. Rapone, Jr.
